- Examine the merits of evolutionary psychology. Clearly, some of its proponents go too far; does it ever provide us with genuine illumination about certain features of our society or psychology?
- Are Buller and Haufe's criticisms completely fair or is there some way for evolutionary psychologists to respond?
- Does Neander succeed at making room for teleology (proper functions) in a mechanistic world? Evaluate her case.
- Paul Davies argues that the systemic capacity theory of functions actually subsumes selected effects functions — does he succeed?
- Are “malfunctions” impossible? Davies claims so in his paper “Malfunctions” [PDF] (the argument is also sketched in his “The Nature of Natural Norms”). Evaluate this claim.
- Dupré and Kitcher suggest that we ought to be pluralists about natural kinds. Evaluate their arguments.
- What are the prospects for natural kinds essentialism? Does Devitt make a compelling case for recognize at least partly intrinsic essences?
Thursday, February 26, 2009
More Suggested Essay Topics
Here are some further topic ideas you might think about for your first essays. Note that you should not simply think of yourself as answering these questions: you should develop a specific thesis and argue for it carefully, in depth. I am also happy to direct you to further readings on your chosen topic (the Sober collection is generally a good place to start, as is the Sterelny and Griffiths book).
Assingment 7 (due 3/4)
One initially plausible objection to my SPC account of natural kinds concerns the specific notion of stability: doesn't this account imply that there can be no natural kinds of unstable elements? For instance, am I committed to the thesis that Uranium-238 is not a natural kind? Surely this would be a good reason for rejecting my account. Do me a favor and construct a response on my behalf.
If you cannot see that this objection has a good response, try to develop it in the most forceful way you can and explain why you do not believe that a response is possible.
If you cannot see that this objection has a good response, try to develop it in the most forceful way you can and explain why you do not believe that a response is possible.
Meeting 8: A Different Kind of Natural Kind (3/4)
Readings:
The thesis that natural kinds must possess essences, though natural and popular, does not seem to be part of the concept of a natural kind. Their inferential and explanatory role is, to my mind, more central. We’ll focus on a strand of anti-essentialism committed to this stance. Richard Boyd (a philosopher at Cornell) is perhaps the best known defender of anti-essentialism about natural kinds — though I should immediately point out that it is somewhat controversial whether his view should be reckoned as "anti-essentialist" (this is something I'll want to talk about). He defends what he calls a “homeostatic property cluster” (HPC) account of natural kinds on which rather than an essence maintaining the correlation among a bunch of properties we associate with a given kind, the properties, in a way, correlate themselves. No one property among this “cluster” of properties need be regarded as the essence of that kind — they all are. Nor must we view all of the properties as necessarily possessed by members of the HPC kind. The relevant homeostasis may be imperfect, after all.
I find this picture very appealing. But I’m not certain what counts as a homeostatic mechanism and what is meant by certain phrases Boyd uses to cash out this notion: “the causal structure of the world” and so on. This quibble can be answered, I suppose. One answer I can imagine is: “Oh, come on! You know well enough what I mean by ‘the causal structure of the world’! It’s the whole causal economy: the way things work, how everything fits together, what science studies.” But even supposing something like this helped (and I don’t see that it does), a bigger problem for the HPC view is that the kind of homeostasis that Boyd assumes is present is often apparently lacking: say, for higher taxa, species undergoing disruptive selection, or taxa (at the species rank and otherwise) whose coherence is maintained by “phylogenetic inertia”. It seems to me that all we are really committed to with the reality of species is their broad explanatory utility and this can be secured simply by the stability that the relevant cluster of properties features. I defend this thesis in more detail in my “Why the Long Face?” using examples other than species. The paper is a bit on the long side (sorry — this is actually the SHORT version, believe it or not), so you can skim section 2 if pressed for time (you've already heard my views on many of these issues).
Study Questions
- Boyd, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa” [PDF]
- Slater, “Why the Long Face? The Stable Property Cluster Account of Natural Kinds” [PDF]
The thesis that natural kinds must possess essences, though natural and popular, does not seem to be part of the concept of a natural kind. Their inferential and explanatory role is, to my mind, more central. We’ll focus on a strand of anti-essentialism committed to this stance. Richard Boyd (a philosopher at Cornell) is perhaps the best known defender of anti-essentialism about natural kinds — though I should immediately point out that it is somewhat controversial whether his view should be reckoned as "anti-essentialist" (this is something I'll want to talk about). He defends what he calls a “homeostatic property cluster” (HPC) account of natural kinds on which rather than an essence maintaining the correlation among a bunch of properties we associate with a given kind, the properties, in a way, correlate themselves. No one property among this “cluster” of properties need be regarded as the essence of that kind — they all are. Nor must we view all of the properties as necessarily possessed by members of the HPC kind. The relevant homeostasis may be imperfect, after all.
I find this picture very appealing. But I’m not certain what counts as a homeostatic mechanism and what is meant by certain phrases Boyd uses to cash out this notion: “the causal structure of the world” and so on. This quibble can be answered, I suppose. One answer I can imagine is: “Oh, come on! You know well enough what I mean by ‘the causal structure of the world’! It’s the whole causal economy: the way things work, how everything fits together, what science studies.” But even supposing something like this helped (and I don’t see that it does), a bigger problem for the HPC view is that the kind of homeostasis that Boyd assumes is present is often apparently lacking: say, for higher taxa, species undergoing disruptive selection, or taxa (at the species rank and otherwise) whose coherence is maintained by “phylogenetic inertia”. It seems to me that all we are really committed to with the reality of species is their broad explanatory utility and this can be secured simply by the stability that the relevant cluster of properties features. I defend this thesis in more detail in my “Why the Long Face?” using examples other than species. The paper is a bit on the long side (sorry — this is actually the SHORT version, believe it or not), so you can skim section 2 if pressed for time (you've already heard my views on many of these issues).
Study Questions
- Briefly describe what an HPC natural kind is. How does it help address the problems facing typological thinking?
- What is Boyd’s accommodation thesis?
- How does the essentialism espoused by Boyd differ from a more “traditional” essentialism about natural kinds?
- What is Boyd’s stance on species pluralism?
- How do explanatory and programmatic definitions differ?
- Does Boyd think that there is an important distinction between species and higher taxa (such as genera)?
- Peacocke draws a distinction between narrow- and wide-scope explanations. Describe it and explain how it is relevant to the discussion of the HPC account.
- Describe a criticism of mine of the HPC view. Do you think Boyd could offer a compelling response?
- What specific problem is posed by disruptive selection?
- What is metastability and how might it be relevant to the discussion of HPC kinds?
- Why is stability important for a potential understanding of natural kinds? What role might it play in such understandings?
- How does the SPC account differ from the HPC account?
Sunday, February 22, 2009
First Half Essay
Remember: I will be recording your first essay score for your best essay I receive by March 11th (in about two and a half weeks!). Remember: you can write as many as you like (and up to two versions of the same essay) and I will only count your best. I strongly recommend you take advantage of this golden opportunity, as I'll be holding you to the high standard expected of a 400/500-level course (according to your specific affiliation).
Specifically, I will be using this rubric to mark your essays. Worry about the tiles of the columns, not the numbers (which will not correspond in the usual way to grades): to get an 'A', you should expect to have most marks in the 'excellent' / 'very good' columns. A 'B' paper will be more centered around the 'very good' column; with 'C', 'D', 'F', as you'd expect. . . . I'll curve numerical scores to reflect this. Bear in mind, however, that as time approaches (if I'm getting lots of submissions at the same time, my ability to turn around the paper quickly for you to revise or rewrite completely will decrease; the sooner you get me something, the more likely it is that you'll be able to revise it into something better)
I highly recommend going through multiple drafts before submitting something. Take account of the writing advice on my website along with the associated links. I can't recommend the "Bennett Rules" — see Bennett and Gorovitz’s essay on “Teaching Academic Writing” — highly enough. Ask yourself honestly whether the paper is as clear and precise as it can be. Write not only so that you can be understood, but so you cannot be misunderstood.
Specifically, I will be using this rubric to mark your essays. Worry about the tiles of the columns, not the numbers (which will not correspond in the usual way to grades): to get an 'A', you should expect to have most marks in the 'excellent' / 'very good' columns. A 'B' paper will be more centered around the 'very good' column; with 'C', 'D', 'F', as you'd expect. . . . I'll curve numerical scores to reflect this. Bear in mind, however, that as time approaches (if I'm getting lots of submissions at the same time, my ability to turn around the paper quickly for you to revise or rewrite completely will decrease; the sooner you get me something, the more likely it is that you'll be able to revise it into something better)
I highly recommend going through multiple drafts before submitting something. Take account of the writing advice on my website along with the associated links. I can't recommend the "Bennett Rules" — see Bennett and Gorovitz’s essay on “Teaching Academic Writing” — highly enough. Ask yourself honestly whether the paper is as clear and precise as it can be. Write not only so that you can be understood, but so you cannot be misunderstood.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Assignment 6 (due 2/25)
Pick two of the study questions for Meeting 7 to answer in no more than one sheet total (it may be double-sided).
Meeting 7: Resurrecting Essentialism? (2/25)
Readings:
Michael Devitt has very recently critiqued this consensus as unargued for dogma and presents a new argument in favor of the thesis that biological taxa do in fact possess "at least partly intrinsic" essences. Along the way, he makes a number of important and interesting points worth discussing. Continuing in my critical vein --- you'll have something positive from me at last next week! ---, I argue that Devitt's case for essentialism falls flat. This is not, notice, to argue that essentialism is false --- that's something I want to talk about in more detail with you --- just that we do not yet have good enough reason for being very confident about essentialism.
To foreshadow a later topic a bit, you might give some thought to the role that biological laws play in Devitt's argument. Many philosophers, as you'll see, are deeply skeptical of the idea that there are any distinctively biological laws (let alone laws about particular species). On the other hand, some (like Sandra Mitchell and maybe Marc Lange) hold a view that seems to regard laws as coming in degrees. I'm going to try to write a further section of my paper on how that sort of view might affect the essentialist thesis.
Study Questions
- Okasha, “Darwinian Metaphysics” [PDF] *
- Devitt, “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism” [PDF]
- Slater, “Biological Laws and Essences” [PDF]
Michael Devitt has very recently critiqued this consensus as unargued for dogma and presents a new argument in favor of the thesis that biological taxa do in fact possess "at least partly intrinsic" essences. Along the way, he makes a number of important and interesting points worth discussing. Continuing in my critical vein --- you'll have something positive from me at last next week! ---, I argue that Devitt's case for essentialism falls flat. This is not, notice, to argue that essentialism is false --- that's something I want to talk about in more detail with you --- just that we do not yet have good enough reason for being very confident about essentialism.
To foreshadow a later topic a bit, you might give some thought to the role that biological laws play in Devitt's argument. Many philosophers, as you'll see, are deeply skeptical of the idea that there are any distinctively biological laws (let alone laws about particular species). On the other hand, some (like Sandra Mitchell and maybe Marc Lange) hold a view that seems to regard laws as coming in degrees. I'm going to try to write a further section of my paper on how that sort of view might affect the essentialist thesis.
Study Questions
- What, specifically, do you take Devitt's thesis to be? Try to explain it in detailed, neutral terms.
- Devitt mentions an important distinction between a "taxon problem" and a "category problem": what is this distinction?
- How might the taxon and category problems relate to each other?
- How is the above distinction important to Devitt's argument?
- How does Devitt propose to avoid the anti-essentialism purportedly implied by relational species concepts?
- What are Devitt's two arguments for Essentialism?
- Does Slater miss anything in interpreting these arguments? (No really: do I?)
- Describe (and critically evaluate) Slater's criticism of Devitt's first argument.
- Describe (and critically evaluate) Slater's criticism of Devitt's first argument.
- What is the "Monsters Problem" and how does Devitt respond to it?
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Meeting 6: The Species Problem & the Metaphysics of Species (2/18)
Readings:
In an oft-quoted letter to Joseph Hooker (24 December 1856), Darwin took the difficulty of reaching agreement about a correct conception of species as well-nigh insuperable:
The question What are species? has a different sense. Rather than asking after the conditions under which some organisms belong to a species taxon, we might be interested to know into what ontological category these taxa belong. What is an "ontological category"? This in itself is a somewhat fraught question, but the basic idea is that it is a fundamental category of being: for example, objects, processes, events, properties, sets, numbers, propositions, and so forth might all be considered as such categories. If I ask you What are tables? You might respond by trying to tell me the specific conditions under which some pieces of wood compose a table. Or you might start much more generally by telling me that tables are a certain sort of object, thus distinguishing them from properties or events. Tables and wars are in different ontological categories: the former are objects, the latter are events.
Now then: What sort of thing are species? To what ontological category do they belong? We've already seen some concern about treating species as natural kinds (to some, as certain kinds of sets or classes). Perhaps we should consider an alternative. In this spirit, Michael Ghiselin proposed a "radical solution to the species problem":
The case was taken up by David Hull, an influential philosopher of biology (now emeritus at Northwestern), who offered many reason for treating species as individuals (though it is not always clear what precisely he means by this term). You might think as you’re reading whether his reasons for defending the thesis shed more light on the details of his thesis. What are his reasons? Are the good?
This is where Kitcher’s paper on “Species” picks up: he suggests that Hull fails to offer us good reason for accepting the species-as-individuals (SAI) thesis. Kitcher defends the view that species are certain kinds of sets, arguing that this thesis becomes a straw-man in Hull’s essay. But Kitcher takes the species problem seriously. Perhaps we go wrong to assume that there is just one privileged species concept. But does a plurality of species concepts imply that species are not real? He thinks not. We can be pluralistic realists about species. I suspect that we may want to put this case off for another week or so.
Despite Kitcher's criticisms of Ghiselin and Hull, SAI is more popular than ever. My paper "On the Contentious Metaphysics of Species" critiques some recent arguments for SAI in the context of the early arguments. Of course, even if our criticisms hit their mark, SAI might still be true (don't confuse the truth of a thesis with its pedigree). This is roughly the sense I’ve gotten from many philosophers of biology over the years: "yes, Hull makes an inconclusive case for SAI — but it’s still the best metaphysics of species." Even Kitcher later contended that the issue doesn't bear on anything: one can equally well construe species as individuals or sets. I disagree. My paper "Against the Individuality of Species" makes the case that SAI incurs certain expenses that biologists should not front! As this case is primarily metaphysical (trading in particular on particular theses about ontological vagueness), those non-philosophers of you might find things a bit opaque (hence its being optional). But if you’re interested in getting some further background on vagueness, I can recommend Roy Sorensen’s SEP entry and Achille Varzi’s (2001) article “Vagueness, Logic, and Ontology” (particularly the section on ontological versus semantic vagueness).
Study Questions
- S&D Chapter 9: “Species” **
- Hull, “A Matter of Individuality” [CIEB §18] **
- Kitcher, “Species” [PDF]
- Crane, “On the Metaphysics of Species” [PDF] *
- Slater, “On the Contentious Metaphysics of Species” [PDF]
- Slater, “Against the Individuality of Species” [PDF] **
In an oft-quoted letter to Joseph Hooker (24 December 1856), Darwin took the difficulty of reaching agreement about a correct conception of species as well-nigh insuperable:
It is really laughable to see what different ideas are prominent in various naturalists’ minds when they speak of species; in some, resemblance is everything and descent of little weight — in some, resemblance seems to go for nothing, and Creation the reigning idea — In some, descent is the key, — in some, sterility an unfailing test, with others it is not worth a farthing. It all comes, I believe, from trying to define the indefinable.I think he was too quick to give up, but it’s notable that the same sort of disagreements persist: on one recent count, there were over twenty different species concepts being actively pursued. Is just one of these the correct one? Or perhaps we haven't yet come up with the correct species concept. . . . The issue of whether there is just one privileged conception of species (or biological taxa generally) is often referred to as the debate between "monism" and "pluralism" about species. Kitcher contends that we should be pluralists about species — there is no uniquely correct way of dividing up biological reality. Yet, this doesn't mean that species are not real or that there are objective divisions between different biological groups. So he claims. We'll want to talk about this.
The question What are species? has a different sense. Rather than asking after the conditions under which some organisms belong to a species taxon, we might be interested to know into what ontological category these taxa belong. What is an "ontological category"? This in itself is a somewhat fraught question, but the basic idea is that it is a fundamental category of being: for example, objects, processes, events, properties, sets, numbers, propositions, and so forth might all be considered as such categories. If I ask you What are tables? You might respond by trying to tell me the specific conditions under which some pieces of wood compose a table. Or you might start much more generally by telling me that tables are a certain sort of object, thus distinguishing them from properties or events. Tables and wars are in different ontological categories: the former are objects, the latter are events.
Now then: What sort of thing are species? To what ontological category do they belong? We've already seen some concern about treating species as natural kinds (to some, as certain kinds of sets or classes). Perhaps we should consider an alternative. In this spirit, Michael Ghiselin proposed a "radical solution to the species problem":
It would appear that the philosophy of taxonomy is about to undergo a major upheaval. Symptomatic is its Gordian knot, the species problem. Some years ago (Ghiselin, 1966a) I attempted to cut it with the sword, casually remarking that, in the logical sense, species are individuals, not classes. (1976, 536)The idea seems to be that if we treat species as classes (that is, sets or collections of organisms), we force ourselves into Mayr’s dreaded typological thinking. For the reality of the class would only be secured by some defining essence shared by all (and only) its members. But typology in this sense appears implausible. Perhaps some things have essences (gold, water, electrons, &c.), but the essentialism appears ill-suited to the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of the biological world.
The case was taken up by David Hull, an influential philosopher of biology (now emeritus at Northwestern), who offered many reason for treating species as individuals (though it is not always clear what precisely he means by this term). You might think as you’re reading whether his reasons for defending the thesis shed more light on the details of his thesis. What are his reasons? Are the good?
This is where Kitcher’s paper on “Species” picks up: he suggests that Hull fails to offer us good reason for accepting the species-as-individuals (SAI) thesis. Kitcher defends the view that species are certain kinds of sets, arguing that this thesis becomes a straw-man in Hull’s essay. But Kitcher takes the species problem seriously. Perhaps we go wrong to assume that there is just one privileged species concept. But does a plurality of species concepts imply that species are not real? He thinks not. We can be pluralistic realists about species. I suspect that we may want to put this case off for another week or so.
Despite Kitcher's criticisms of Ghiselin and Hull, SAI is more popular than ever. My paper "On the Contentious Metaphysics of Species" critiques some recent arguments for SAI in the context of the early arguments. Of course, even if our criticisms hit their mark, SAI might still be true (don't confuse the truth of a thesis with its pedigree). This is roughly the sense I’ve gotten from many philosophers of biology over the years: "yes, Hull makes an inconclusive case for SAI — but it’s still the best metaphysics of species." Even Kitcher later contended that the issue doesn't bear on anything: one can equally well construe species as individuals or sets. I disagree. My paper "Against the Individuality of Species" makes the case that SAI incurs certain expenses that biologists should not front! As this case is primarily metaphysical (trading in particular on particular theses about ontological vagueness), those non-philosophers of you might find things a bit opaque (hence its being optional). But if you’re interested in getting some further background on vagueness, I can recommend Roy Sorensen’s SEP entry and Achille Varzi’s (2001) article “Vagueness, Logic, and Ontology” (particularly the section on ontological versus semantic vagueness).
Study Questions
- Explain how the SAI thesis might fit into the debate about typology versus population thinking.
- How does Kitcher’s assertion that “there is no inconsistency in claiming that species are sets and denying that the members of these sets share a common property” (310) answer one of Hull’s arguments for SAI?
- Describe and evaluate Kitcher's arguments for pluralism.
- Explain some objections to the biological species concept.
- Do you think that pluralism is compatible with realism about species?
- Describe Kitcher's lizard example and what it is intended to show.
- What is the difference between historical and structural explanations? How does this distinction bear on the case for pluralism?
- Does pluralism involve the claim that any species concept is acceptable? Why or why not?
- Why is problematic for SAI-ists to adduce the necessary spatiotemporal connectedness of species as evidence for SAI?
- What is Crane's argument for SAI and what difficulties does it face?
Assignment 5 (due 2/18)
Summarize Kitcher's basic argument for species pluralism as carefully and precisely as you can. If space allows, comment on any potential weak points or premises that appear to need further discussion or support.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Assignment 4 (due 2/11)
(a) Carefully describe the difference between "typological" and "population" thinking.
(b) From what you gather in the Dupré reading, in which camps would you expect Dupré and Putnam to place their allegiances?
(b) From what you gather in the Dupré reading, in which camps would you expect Dupré and Putnam to place their allegiances?
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Meeting 5: Biological Kinds (2/11)
Required Readings:
The traditional way is by construing some categories (which we call "natural kinds") to be characterized by essential properties — qualities which make things of a particular kind the things of that kind. The late, great biologist (one of the chief architects of the so-called “modern synthesis” of evolutionary biology) Ernst Mayr takes Plato to task for attempting to apply an eidos (something like an abstract type; see CIEB, p. 326) to species. While he’s correct that the notion probably originated with Plato and his theory of forms, it received a much more sophisticated and unmysterious expression with Aristotle. He believed that there was some property (or group of properties) that qualified an organism as the kind of thing it is. Ditto for other examples. Water is a favorite example of modern essentialists like Kripke and Putnam. According to them, the essence of water is having that molecular structure (the one denoted by ‘H2O’); something is water just in case it is composed of H2O and even if that something still looked like and behaved like water. (So goes the thought. My own feeling is that this is much less clear than might at first appear.) However that may be, it was widely thought that species have essences and that this is what makes them real.
But essentialism underpins what Mayr calls "typological thinking". And essentialism may be at the root of many of typology’s supposed ills. Against Aristotle and Plato, I agree with Mayr that we should construe variation as the norm in the biological realm. But there are difficult interpretive questions about what population thinking means for Mayr and how it ought to influence how we conduct and conceive of biology. John Dupré takes on essentialism via Kripke and Putnam's more sophisticated version. He is much exercised by the mismatch between scientific taxonomies and ordinary language classifications.
Study Questions
- Ridley, “Species Concepts and Intraspecific Variation” [Chapter 13 of Evolution; PDF] **
- Slater, "Natural Kinds" [PDF] --- forthcoming! **
- Mayr, “Typological versus Population Thinking” [CIEB §16]
- Sober, “Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism” [CIEB §17] *
- Dupré, "Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa" [PDF]
The traditional way is by construing some categories (which we call "natural kinds") to be characterized by essential properties — qualities which make things of a particular kind the things of that kind. The late, great biologist (one of the chief architects of the so-called “modern synthesis” of evolutionary biology) Ernst Mayr takes Plato to task for attempting to apply an eidos (something like an abstract type; see CIEB, p. 326) to species. While he’s correct that the notion probably originated with Plato and his theory of forms, it received a much more sophisticated and unmysterious expression with Aristotle. He believed that there was some property (or group of properties) that qualified an organism as the kind of thing it is. Ditto for other examples. Water is a favorite example of modern essentialists like Kripke and Putnam. According to them, the essence of water is having that molecular structure (the one denoted by ‘H2O’); something is water just in case it is composed of H2O and even if that something still looked like and behaved like water. (So goes the thought. My own feeling is that this is much less clear than might at first appear.) However that may be, it was widely thought that species have essences and that this is what makes them real.
But essentialism underpins what Mayr calls "typological thinking". And essentialism may be at the root of many of typology’s supposed ills. Against Aristotle and Plato, I agree with Mayr that we should construe variation as the norm in the biological realm. But there are difficult interpretive questions about what population thinking means for Mayr and how it ought to influence how we conduct and conceive of biology. John Dupré takes on essentialism via Kripke and Putnam's more sophisticated version. He is much exercised by the mismatch between scientific taxonomies and ordinary language classifications.
Study Questions
- What is the basic difference between typological and population thinking?
- Mayr argues against the thought that evolutionary gradualism and typological thinking are compatible. Explicate and evaluate this argument.
- What role does Putnam's "Twin Earth" thought experiment play?
- How does Dupré respond to the Twin Earth thought experiment? Are you sympathetic or has Dupré exaggerated the problems?
- What exactly is the worry about the lilies? Is it serious?
- Do you think that taxonomic realism is more or less plausible at higher levels of classification than species? What is Dupré's view on this question? What about Mayr?
- What reasons are there to be pessimistic that the "privileged sameness relations" Putnam seems to need for his theory exist at the level of species?
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