Meeting 7: Resurrecting Essentialism? (2/25)

Readings:

• Okasha, “Darwinian Metaphysics” [PDF] *
• Devitt, “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism” [PDF]
• Slater, “Biological Laws and Essences” [PDF]

So far we've seen several philosopher pile on against the thesis that species (or other biological taxa) should be treated as natural kinds in the Kripke/Putnam essentialist mold. A central part of the motivation for the species-as-individuals thesis the denial of biological essentialism; ditto for Mayr's resistance to typological thinking in favor of population thinking. There's something of a consensus forming that species lacked essential properties --- intrinsic properties which made them the sorts of things they are.

Michael Devitt has very recently critiqued this consensus as unargued for dogma and presents a new argument in favor of the thesis that biological taxa do in fact possess "at least partly intrinsic" essences. Along the way, he makes a number of important and interesting points worth discussing. Continuing in my critical vein --- you'll have something positive from me at last next week! ---, I argue that Devitt's case for essentialism falls flat. This is not, notice, to argue that essentialism is false --- that's something I want to talk about in more detail with you --- just that we do not yet have good enough reason for being very confident about essentialism.

To foreshadow a later topic a bit, you might give some thought to the role that biological laws play in Devitt's argument. Many philosophers, as you'll see, are deeply skeptical of the idea that there are any distinctively biological laws (let alone laws about particular species). On the other hand, some (like Sandra Mitchell and maybe Marc Lange) hold a view that seems to regard laws as coming in degrees. I'm going to try to write a further section of my paper on how that sort of view might affect the essentialist thesis.

Study Questions

• What, specifically, do you take Devitt's thesis to be? Try to explain it in detailed, neutral terms.
• Devitt mentions an important distinction between a "taxon problem" and a "category problem": what is this distinction?
• How might the taxon and category problems relate to each other?
• How is the above distinction important to Devitt's argument?
• How does Devitt propose to avoid the anti-essentialism purportedly implied by relational species concepts?
• What are Devitt's two arguments for Essentialism?
• Does Slater miss anything in interpreting these arguments? (No really: do I?)
• Describe (and critically evaluate) Slater's criticism of Devitt's first argument.
• Describe (and critically evaluate) Slater's criticism of Devitt's first argument.
• What is the "Monsters Problem" and how does Devitt respond to it?