- Rosenberg, “How is Biological Explanation Possible?” [PDF]
- Lange, “The Autonomy of Functional Biology: a Reply to Rosenberg” [PDF]
Presentations:
Cameron | Brian commenting
Graham | Cameron commenting
Rosenberg begins his essay by considering an apparent problem for Hempel’s famous "Deductive-Nomological" (D-N) Account of explanation (also known as the "Covering-Law Model"). The model is so-called, because it identifies an explanation as an argument with some premises (e.g., those stating initial conditions) together with a law statement that deductively implies a conclusion: the event or state of affairs to be explained (the “explanandum”). For example: why did the window shatter? The explanation is that in a fit of rage, I threw a rock at it. There’s no law statement evident in that explanation, but Hempel thought that it was implicit. The fact that I threw a certain object only provides an explanation of the window breaking if that action is connected via a law to the explanandum.
If it turns out, then, that biology has no laws, and we buy the D-N model of explanation, it is unclear how biological explanation is possible. As Rosenberg notes: we need to take for granted that biology does provide explanations — we philosophers had better be able to make sense of this obvious fact.
This is just the background to the dispute between Lange and Rosenberg. Rosenberg’s (2001) is a response to Lange (1995) and Lange (2004) replies to Rosenberg (2001) — we’re giving Lange the last word here. Lange’s account of natural laws in functional biology will also illuminate the question about “reduction” and “special science autonomy” that we grappled with earlier.
Study Questions
Cameron | Brian commenting
Graham | Cameron commenting
Rosenberg begins his essay by considering an apparent problem for Hempel’s famous "Deductive-Nomological" (D-N) Account of explanation (also known as the "Covering-Law Model"). The model is so-called, because it identifies an explanation as an argument with some premises (e.g., those stating initial conditions) together with a law statement that deductively implies a conclusion: the event or state of affairs to be explained (the “explanandum”). For example: why did the window shatter? The explanation is that in a fit of rage, I threw a rock at it. There’s no law statement evident in that explanation, but Hempel thought that it was implicit. The fact that I threw a certain object only provides an explanation of the window breaking if that action is connected via a law to the explanandum.
If it turns out, then, that biology has no laws, and we buy the D-N model of explanation, it is unclear how biological explanation is possible. As Rosenberg notes: we need to take for granted that biology does provide explanations — we philosophers had better be able to make sense of this obvious fact.
This is just the background to the dispute between Lange and Rosenberg. Rosenberg’s (2001) is a response to Lange (1995) and Lange (2004) replies to Rosenberg (2001) — we’re giving Lange the last word here. Lange’s account of natural laws in functional biology will also illuminate the question about “reduction” and “special science autonomy” that we grappled with earlier.
Study Questions
- What is Rosenberg’s argument that there can be “few if any strict laws in biology”?
- What is Rosenberg’s argument that there can be “no non-strict laws [in biology]”?
- What is the importance of the concept of natural selection “arms races” (think about the Newts/Garter snakes mentioned earlier in the term)?
- How does Lange respond to Rosenberg’s contentions about arms races?
- Rosenberg contends that Lange’s (1995) use of statements of the form ‘The S is T’ is difficult to construe as a natural law. Why is this?
- Do you think Rosenberg’s proposed law achieves his advertised goals? Does it provide a way of understanding explanations in biology?
- Lange suggests that Rosenberg’s core argument against generalizations like ‘The S is T’ counting as laws involves their possible falsification, not that they will eventually go false (2004, 96). Does this strengthen or weaken Rosenberg’s argument?
- Why does Lange think it’s implausible that “the range of counterfactual suppositions under which an accident is invariant” need not be narrower than the range of a law’s invariance? (Think through the apple-tree and wire examples.)
- How does Lange make room for laws of functional biology by seeing NP as a “general schema” (97)?
No comments:
Post a Comment